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This paper assesses the first three years of the inflation targeting regime 
adopted in July 1999 in Brazil. The inflation targeting framework has shown 
to be highly important for the macroeconomic stabilization. We stress three 
important challenges: construction of credibility, change in relative prices, 
and exchange rate volatility. The estimations indicate the following results: 
i) the inflation targets have worked as an important coordinator of 
expectations; ii) the Central Bank has reacted strongly to inflation 
expectations; iii) there has been a reduction in the degree of persistence in 
inflation and in the volatility of inflation and output; iv) the exchange rate 
pass-through for "administered or monitored" prices is more than two times 
higher than for "market" prices. We also describe the methodology the 
Central Bank has developed to deal with inflationary shocks, which 
quantifies the sources of inflation, and examine some issues involved in the 
institutional design of inflation targeting. 
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1. Introduction 
 
This paper assesses the inflation targeting regime adopted in July 1999 in Brazil, 
examining the challenges faced in its first three years. The inflation targeting 
mechanism has shown to be highly important for the macroeconomic stabilization. In 
spite of different inflationary pressures, the inflation rate has been maintained at a low 
level in the context of a floating exchange rate regime and inflationary shocks. We 
stress three important challenges that are also common in other emerging market 
economies: construction of credibility, change in relative prices, and exchange rate 
volatility. Moreover, we describe the methodology used to deal with inflationary 
shocks, and examine some issues involved in the institutional design of inflation 
targeting, such as the use of core inflation measures, escape clauses, tolerance intervals, 
establishment of targets, and target horizon. 
  We show that the inflation expectations of the private sector have not been 
departing significantly from the targets in the face of inflationary shocks. Other 
evidence also supports the view that the established inflation targets have worked as an 
important coordinator of expectations. The estimated reaction function of the Central 
Bank shows that monetary policy has been reacting strongly to inflationary pressures. In 
particular, the Central Bank reacts to inflation expectations, providing evidence that 
monetary policy is conducted on a forward-looking basis. We also find some evidence 
of change in inflation rate dynamics, basically the reduction in the degree of persistence 
in inflation. The volatility of output and inflation has also decreased in the inflation 
targeting period. 
  We also stress the significant inflationary pressures stemming from the change 
in relative prices in the economy ("administered or monitored" versus "market" prices) 
and from the exchange rate volatility in the last years. We estimate the pass-through 
from exchange rate to inflation rate using a vector autoregression (VAR) estimation, 
showing the higher pass-through for "administered or monitored" prices. 
The Central Bank has developed a methodology to estimate the inflationary 
effects of change in relative prices, exchange rate depreciation, and inflation inertia. The 
corresponding results help the conduct of monetary policy as it quantifies the sources of 
inflation.  
Section 2 presents an overview of the first three years of inflation targeting. 
Section 3 assesses the different challenges for the inflation targeting regime. Section 4   5
presents the methodology used to deal with shocks, and Section 5 examines some issues 
involved in the institutional design of inflation targeting. A final section concludes the 
paper. 
 
2. Overview of the first three years of inflation targeting 
 
The current inflation targeting regime was adopted in mid-1999, after the 
floating of the currency in January of the same year. In the first two years, inflation rates 
were kept on target, having absorbed the initial impact of the exchange rate depreciation 
in 1999. The successful transition was supported by a considerable fiscal improvement, 
a shift from the primary surplus of 0.01% of GDP in 1998 to 3.23% in 1999, 3.51% in 
2000, 3.68% in 2001, and 3.54% in the last 12 months up to August 2002. The 
macroeconomic policy has three basic elements: floating exchange rate regime, change 
in the fiscal regime, and inflation targeting. 
The targets are established in June year t for calendar year inflation at t+2, 
except for 1999 and 2000, when both targets were set in June 1999. The inflation rate is 
measured by a consumer price index, the IPCA, produced by IBGE. Figure 1 shows the 
targets for 1999-2004, and actual inflation for 1999-2001. Up to 2002, the tolerance 
intervals were 2 percentage points above and below the central target, and as of 2003 
the intervals were enlarged to 2.5 percentage points. The inflation rate was 8.9% and 
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However, in 2001 and 2002, several external and domestic shocks hit the 
Brazilian economy with significant impact on inflation. The inflation rate reached 7.7% 
in 2001, 1.7 p.p. above the upper limit of the inflation target,
1 and is expected to be 
above the upper limit in 2002 as well. The energy crisis, the deceleration of the world 
economy, the September 11 attacks on the United States, and the Argentine crisis 
generated strong pressure for the depreciation of the Real in 2001. In October, the 
average exchange rate had increased by 39.6% (a depreciation of domestic currency of 
28.3%) when compared to the average of December 2001. Figure 2 shows the exchange 
rate level since 1998. In 2002, the shocks included increased risk aversion in capital 
markets, and uncertainties related to Brazil's future macroeconomic policies under the 
upcoming government, leading to a new wave of depreciation. 
 
The change in relative prices in the economy affected the inflation rate 
significantly as well. The administered by contract or monitored prices – administered 
prices, for short – rose well above the other prices – market prices, for short. The 
administered prices are defined as the ones little affected by domestic demand and 
supply conditions or that are in someway regulated by some public agency. The group 
was defined by the Monetary Policy Committee (Copom) in July 2001, and includes oil 
by-products, fixed telephone, residential electricity, and public transportation. Its weight 
                                                 
1 The reasons for the non-fulfillment of the target in 2001 were explained in an open letter from the 
Governor of the Central Bank of Brazil to the Minister of Finance, available at www.bcb.gov.br. 
Figure 2 















































































































































































in the IPCA was 30.8% in June 2002. Furthermore, the energy crisis, from 2001 to the 
beginning of 2002, and the deregulation of oil by-product markets also led to 
inflationary pressures. 
  Figure 3 shows the exchange rate depreciation, the increase in administered and 
market prices, and inflation rate for 2001 and 2002 (up to August). The administered 
prices rose 10.4% in 2001 and 7.6% in January-August 2002, whereas market prices 
increased by 6.5% and 3.7%, respectively (the values for 2002 are not annualized).  
Using the structural model of the Central Bank
2 and information concerning the 
mechanisms for the adjustment of administered prices, it is possible to estimate the 
contribution for the inflation rate stemming from exchange rate pass-through, inflation 
inertia from the previous year, and inflation of administered prices and market prices 
that is not explained by the exchange rate pass-through and the inertia referred to. 
Figures 4 and 5 show the values for 2001 and January-August 2002. The values in the 
inner part of the charts are the percentage point contributions for the inflation rate, and, 
in the outer part, the corresponding proportion. In 2001, 38% of the inflation rate can be 
explained by the exchange rate depreciation, whereas for January-August 2002 the 
contribution of the exchange rate reaches 48%. 
                                                 
2 For an overview of the structural model, see Bogdanski et al. (2000). Using the aggregate supply curve, 
which relates the current inflation of market prices to the expected and past headline inflation, output gap, 
and exchange rate change, we estimate the contributions of the exchange rate pass-through and of the 
inertia from the previous year for market prices. For administered prices, the estimation depends on the 
criteria used for the price adjustment of specific items. 
Figure 3
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In 2001 and 2002, the Central Bank acted preemptively, aiming at minimizing 
the potential inflationary effects of the different shocks, mainly the exchange rate 
Figure 4
Contributions to Inflation in 2001





















Contributions to Inflation in Jan.-Aug. 2002
Percentage of the Total and Percentage Variation (values within the chart) in the Period 
Market Prices Inflation 

















depreciation and the increase in administered prices. The main guideline of monetary 
policy was to limit the propagation of the shocks to the other prices in the economy. 
Figure 6 presents the path of the basic interest rate – the Selic rate – controlled by the 
Central Bank. Between March and July 2001, the Central Bank raised the interest rate 
significantly (375 basis points), interrupting the downward trend observed previously. 
Some improvement in the macroeconomic context at the beginning of 2002 allowed 
some reduction of the interest rate, interrupted by the inflationary pressure coming from 
the exchange rate depreciation. If the Central Bank had not acted preemptively, inflation 
would have been higher than actually observed, and the adjustment in the real exchange 
rate would have taken place in an environment of greater uncertainty. In view of the 
intensity and magnitude of the shocks that hit the Brazilian economy in 2001 and 2002, 
the cost in terms of output losses of a policy aimed at offsetting completely these shocks 
and keeping inflation within the tolerance intervals would have been significantly 
higher. 
 
We can also verify that there has been a gain in terms of variability of the 
inflation rate, output, and interest rate. Table 1 reports the average, standard error and 
coefficient of variation (ratio of standard error to average). It compares the first three 
years of inflation targeting with the Real Plan period before the adoption of inflation 
targeting. For this last period, the table also reports the figures for a shorter sample, 
which excludes the first quarters of the Real Plan, characterized by a transition to 
Figure 6












































































































































stabilization. The inflation rate is measured by IPCA, output by seasonally adjusted 
GDP, and the (nominal) interest rate by the Selic rate. We use quarterly data. In the case 
of GDP, we use the annualized quarter over quarter growth rates. The variability of 
output, inflation, and interest rate is smaller in the inflation targeting period. This does 
not imply necessarily that there have been gains in terms of trade-off between output 
and inflation because this result also depends on the magnitude and variability of the 
shocks that hit the economy. In terms of average, the output growth is higher and the 
interest rate is lower in the inflation targeting period. The inflation rate is smaller if we 
compare to the whole period before inflation targeting. In the case of the 1996:01-
1999:02 period, the smaller average of the inflation rate is to a large extent a 
consequence of the pegged exchange rate regime, which turned out to be unsustainable 




3. Challenges in inflation targeting  
 
  We stress three important challenges in the first three years of inflation targeting 
in Brazil: construction of credibility, change in relative prices, and exchange rate 
volatility. 
  
3.1. Constructing credibility 
 
  Inflation targeting is, to a large extent, a credibility issue. The Central Bank 
should act and communicate in a way to convince the market that inflation will be under 
control. This section shows the estimates of different specifications for Central Bank 






















Real Plan Before 
Inflation Targeting 
1994:04 - 1999:02 10.3 9.2 0.89 2.0 6.3 3.16 35.4 14.1 0.40
1996:01 - 1999:02 5.8 4.8 0.84 2.0 5.2 2.55 28.2 6.0 0.21
Inflation Targeting 
1999:03 - 2002:02 7.1 3.0 0.42 2.4 3.5 1.46 18.0 1.4 0.08
Table 1
Average, Standard Deviation and Coefficient of Variation for Inflation Rate, GDP and Interest Rate
Different Periods (Quarterly Data)
Interest Rate
Period
Inflation Rate GDP Growth  11
controlling inflation expectations. We show that the Central Bank has been reacting 
strongly to deviations of expected inflation from the target, and that, despite the failure 
to achieve the target in 2001, inflation expectations remain under control. Furthermore, 
we present some indications of change in the inflation rate dynamics. We conclude that 
the Central Bank of Brazil has gained credibility in the conduct of monetary policy. The 
credibility, however, is still under construction as it takes time to achieve it. Besides, the 
absence of central bank independence in the legal framework is an obstacle to achieve 
higher levels of credibility. 
 
3.1.1. The reaction function of the Central Bank 
  We estimate a reaction function of the Central Bank of Brazil that relates the 
interest rate to expected inflation and to the output gap, allowing also for some interest 
rate smoothing: 
  )) ( )( 1 (
*
3 1 2 0 1 1 1 j t j t t t t t E y i i + + − − − + + − + = π π α α α α α ,    (1) 
where it is interest rate, yt is the output gap, Etπt+j is inflation expectations and π
*
t+j is 
the inflation target, both referring to some period in the future, as will be explained 
below.
3 The sample consists of monthly data between July 1999, when the regime was 
formally introduced,
4 and June 2002. 
   We use two different definitions of interest rate. The first one is the base rate 
(Selic rate) decided by Copom in their meetings. The second definition is the interest 
rate gap, defined as the difference between the Selic rate and its trend, estimated by a 
HP-filter.
5 The motivation to use the gap is to have some idea of how the Central Bank 
deviates the interest rate from equilibrium when faced by an increase in inflation 
expectations. This is particularly important for Brazil because, when inflation targeting 
was introduced, real interest rates were considerably high.
6 Therefore, a convergence to 
                                                 
3 Clarida, Galí, and Gertler (1998, 2000) estimate forward-looking reaction functions for France, 
Germany, Italy, Japan, the United Kingdom and the United States. Instead of using central bank or survey 
expectations, they employ a Generalized Method of Moments (GMM) estimation. It is basically a 
forward-looking version of the backward-looking reaction function proposed by Taylor (1993). 
4 Decree 3088 of June 21, 1999 established inflation targeting in Brazil. Therefore, the July Copom 
meeting of that year was the first one under a formal inflation targeting regime.  
5 The Hodrick-Prescott filter was passed over the monthly data series between September 1994 (two 
months after the introduction of the Real) and June 2002. 
6 During the pegged exchange rate regime, which ended in January 1999, the Selic rate needed to be at 
high levels in order to prevent a large outflow of reserves. In the first months following the flotation of   12
steady-state equilibrium would require a downward trend for interest rates. As 
Bogdansky et al. (2001) discuss, in the first two years of the inflation targeting regime, 
several shocks hit the Brazilian economy and, in many cases, the Copom decision was 
to leave interest rate constant. This would be equivalent to an increase in interest rate if 
we consider that the equilibrium interest rate was falling.  
  Monthly industrial production (seasonally adjusted), as measured by IBGE, is 
the proxy for output. The output gap was obtained by the difference between the actual 
and the HP-filtered series.
7 
  We use two sources for inflation expectations. The first is the inflation forecasts 
of the Central Bank of Brazil presented in the quarterly Inflation Report. The advantage 
of this source is that Copom should take interest rate decisions based on its own 
inflation forecasts. The forecasts in the Inflation Report are made assuming a constant 
interest rate equal to the one decided on in the previous Copom meeting. Therefore, they 
signal whether the Central Bank should change the interest rate. However, public 
information about Copom’s inflation forecasts is available only on a quarterly basis. In 
order to obtain monthly figures, it was necessary to interpolate the data. The second 
source is obtained by a daily survey that the Central Bank conducts among financial 
institutions and consulting firms.
8 The survey asks what firms expect for year-end 
inflation in the current and in the following years.
9 This expectation, however, is made 
jointly with an expectation for the interest rate (not necessarily constant). 
  The Brazilian inflation targeting regime sets year-end inflation targets for the 
current and the following two years. Since it is necessary to have a single measurement 
of inflation deviation from the target, it was necessary to create a new variable, 
weighting the expected deviations from target in different years. The variable chosen 
was 
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the real, the Selic rate needed to be kept at high levels to prevent an inflation-exchange rate depreciation 
spiral.  
7 Estimations using output growth and the output gap obtained by extraction of a linear trend were also 
performed. The results were similar and are not reported in this paper.  
8 This survey is available on the Central Bank of Brazil website (www.bcb.gov.br).  In this estimation, we 
use the inflation expectations collected on the eve of Copom meetings, avoiding possible endogeneity 
problems. 
9 In November 2001 the survey started collecting expectations for the following 12 months as well.    13
where Dt is the measure of expected deviation of inflation from the target, j indexes the 
month, and t indexes the year. Therefore, Dt is a weighted average of current year and 
following year expected deviation of inflation from the target, where the weights are 
inversely proportional to the number of months remaining in the year.
10 Observe that Dt 
does not contain inflation expectations referring to two years in advance, despite the 
existence of target for such period. Given the shorter lags in the transmission 
mechanism of monetary policy estimated for the Brazilian economy and the higher 
uncertainty associated with the forecasts, it is reasonable to assume that Copom 
concentrates on current- and following-year forecasts to take interest rate decisions. 
  Table 2 and 3 report the estimations using the Selic interest rate and the gap of 
the Selic interest rate as dependent variable, respectively. Each table presents the 
estimations with inflation forecasts of the Central Bank  (sample 1999:06-2002:06) and 
of the market (sample 2000:01-2002:06).
11 The estimations using only one lag for the 
interest rate usually present serial correlation of the residuals, but this problem is solved 
using two lags.
12 There has been a high degree of interest-rate smoothing. The sum of 
the coefficients on the two lags is 0.8 or above. The coefficient on output gap is usually 
not statistically significant when using market expectations or presents the wrong sign 
when using inflation expectations presented in the Inflation Reports. We have also 
tested for the inclusion of exchange rate change in the reaction function, but this 
variable is not statistically significant. 
  Most importantly, the coefficient on inflation expectation is greater than one and 
significantly different from zero. Employing the Inflation Report's expectations, the 
coefficient is 1.84
13 and 4.25 using the Selic rate and the gap of Selic, respectively. 
Therefore, we can conclude that the Central Bank has been reacting strongly to expected 
inflation. It conducts monetary policy on a forward-looking basis, and responds to 
inflationary pressures. 
                                                 
10 It is not necessary to have a single measure of inflation deviation. If there were enough data, it would 
be possible to use expected inflation for the current and the following years (and possibly more years 
ahead) in the reaction function. But it would then be necessary to introduce dummy variables for the 
months since it is reasonable to assume that the weight given for current year inflation should decrease 
along the year.  
11 The data on IPCA expectations are available only as of January 2000. 
12 In this case, the equation is  )) ( )( 1 (
*
3 1 2 0 4 1 2 4 1 1 j t j t t t t t t E y i i i + + − − − − + + − − + + = π π α α α α α α α . 




  It is interesting to note that such coefficients are around 1.4-1.8 when the 
dependent variable is the Selic rate,
14 and above 3.6 when the dependent variable is the 
gap of the Selic rate. This result supports the view that, given a downward trend for 
interest rates, Copom decisions of leaving the interest rate constant may be interpreted 
as a tightening of monetary policy. Moreover, in the case of the gap of Selic rate, the 
coefficients are significantly different from one in all specifications. 
 
 
                                                 
14 Favero and Giavazzi (2002) also estimated a similar reaction function using market expectations, and 
obtained similar results (coefficient equal to 1.78). Silva and Portugal (2002) used a different 
specification, and obtained different results. 
Constant 17.50*** 17.57*** 16.49*** 16.68***
(0.36) (0.48) (0.63) (0.69)
Interest Rate (t-1) 0.76*** 1.04*** 0.72*** 1.36***
(0.07) (0.13) (0.08) (0.18)
Interest Rate (t-2) -0.20** -0.56***
(0.08) (0.15)
Deviation of Expected Inflation Rate from Target 1.78** 1.84 1.74** 1.42*
(0.84) (1.19) (0.66) (0.72)
Output Gap (t-1) -0.44*** -0.47*** -0.25* -0.13
(0.11) (0.16) (0.13) (0.17)
R-squared 0.9287 0.9418 0.9272 0.9539
Adjusted R-squared 0.9220 0.9342 0.9188 0.9465
LM Test for Autocorrelation of Residuals (p-values)
1 lag 0.0357 0.5186 0.0059 0.7408
4 lags 0.2165 0.6766 0.0757 0.5612
Notes: Standard error in parantheses. *, **, and *** indicate the coefficient is significant at 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively.
Table 2
Estimation of Reaction Function of Central Bank
Dependent Variable: Selic Interest Rate (Monthly Average)
Regressors
With Inflation Report 
Inflation Expectations
With Market Inflation 
Expectations
























3.1.2. Inflation expectations and the role of the targets  
  A naive analysis of the inflation targeting regime in Brazil might say that this 
regime has not been successful in controlling inflation. As Figure 7 shows, since mid-
2001, 12-month inflation has been above the upper limit of the tolerance interval.
15 
Nevertheless, inflation outcomes are not a sufficient statistic for evaluating the 
performance of the Central Bank. The evolution of inflation expectations, and the role 
of the target should be more relevant variables for assessing the credibility of the 
Central Bank. Furthermore, it is necessary to take into account the shocks that hit the 
economy. 
                                                 
15 There are established targets only for year-end inflation. Therefore it was necessary to impute a target 
to the other months of the year, which was done by linear interpolation.  
Constant -1.51*** -1.28*** -3.28*** -3.53***
(0.36) (0.36) (0.54) (0.65)
Gap of Interest Rate (t-1) 0.81*** 1.08*** 0.71*** 1.34***
(0.06) (0.09) (0.08) (0.19)
Gap of Interest Rate (t-2) -0.25*** -0.54***
(0.06) (0.15)
Deviation of Expected Inflation Rate from Target 5.01*** 4.25*** 3.70*** 3.63***
(0.92) (0.77) (0.58) (0.68)
Output Gap (t-1) -0.38** -0.43*** -0.05 0.08
(0.15) (0.13) (0.13) (0.17)
R-squared 0.9653 0.9768 0.9694 0.9797
Adjusted R-squared 0.9620 0.9738 0.9658 0.9765
LM Test for Autocorrelation of Residuals (p-values)
1 lag 0.1254 0.4020 0.0080 0.4255
4 lags 0.0796 0.4754 0.0461 0.4356
Notes: Standard error in parantheses. *, **, and *** indicate the coefficient is significant at 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively. 
Table 3
Regressors
With Inflation Report 
Inflation Expectations
With Market Inflation 
Expectations
Coefficients and standard errors
Estimation of Reaction Function of Central Bank




  Since the introduction of the inflation targeting regime in Brazil, the economy 
has been hit by inflationary shocks, notably by supply and cost-push shocks. As of 
2001, shocks such as the energy crisis, the readjustments of administered prices and the 
exchange rate depreciation have forced the Central Bank to reassess the trade-off 
between inflation and output variability. Since then and, in a more systematic way, since 
January 2002, the conduct of monetary policy has been based on accommodating the 
first-round effects of supply and cost-push shocks. This means monetary policy will 
allow relative price movements to affect inflation, but will neutralize the second-round 
effects.  
  As long as the market understands the objectives of the Central Bank, and its 
conduct is credible, inflation expectations should be contained and, except for 
unforeseen new inflationary shocks, inflation should gravitate around the target. Two 
conditions are necessary to guarantee that inflation expectations will remain controlled. 
The first one is clear communication with the market. The market needs to understand 
why actual inflation was above the target and how monetary policy is being conducted 
in order to make inflation return to the target. The Central Bank of Brazil communicates 
with the market via informal speeches or formal documents, such as the minutes of the 
Copom meetings, which are released one week after the meetings, and the Inflation 
Report, which is published on a quarterly basis. The second condition for controlling 
Figure 7
12-Month Actual Inflation Rate and Inflation Target -
































































































































Central Target Upper limit Lower Limit 12-Month Inflation Rate  17
expectations is that the conduct of monetary policy should be consistent with the main 
guidelines expressed by Copom. In this sense, the reaction function estimated in the 
previous subsection shows that the Central Bank has been acting consistently with the 
inflation targeting framework.  
  Figure 8 suggests that the two conditions stated above have been met. It shows 
the 12-month ahead inflation that is expected by the market, the 12-month ahead target, 
and actual 12-month accumulated inflation. We estimate the 12-month ahead expected 
inflation rate using the expected inflation up to the end of the current year and, for the 
remaining months necessary to achieve 12 months, the corresponding proportion of the 
following year expected inflation. The 12-month ahead target is estimated by 
interpolation. It is clear that inflation expectations have always been below the upper 
limit of the tolerance interval. This has been true even since the second half of 2001, 
when actual inflation surpassed the tolerance interval. The correlation coefficient 
between the actual and expected inflation series is low (0.12). However, there are 
subsamples where the correlation coefficient is higher. For example, after February 
2001, the correlation between the series is 0.70. Even for such subsamples, where 
inflation expectations tend to move closer to previous inflation, the movements of 
expectations tend to be smoother than the movements of actual inflation. As the graph 
shows, the gap between actual and expected inflation increased after mid-2001, when 
actual inflation surpassed the upper limit of the tolerance interval. Therefore, especially 
for this period, the credibility of the Central Bank seemed to be essential to keep 
inflation expectations under control. 
Figure 8
12-Month Ahead Expected Inflation and Inflation Target, and Previous 12-Month Inflation - 






































































































































































































Central Target Upper limit Lower Limit Inflation Expectations Previous 12-Month Inflation  18
  Other evidence to suggest the gains in credibility of the Central Bank is to 
evaluate the role of the target in forming expectations. We have run ordinary least 
squares (OLS) regressions of 12-month ahead market inflation expectations on its own 
lags, the 12-month ahead inflation target and the interest rate (sample 2000:01-
2002:06). Table 4 reports the results. Since we find serial correlation of residuals with 
one lag for expected inflation, we also estimate the model using two lags. All 
coefficients are statistically significant and have the expected sign. The positive 
coefficient on the interest rate may be explained by the reaction of interest rates to 
inflationary pressures. When the Central Bank (and the market) foresees higher 
inflation, the rate of interest is increased. Most importantly, the expected inflation reacts 
 
I II III IV
Constant -4.23*** -4.75*** -4.22*** -4.92***
(1.30) (1.31) (1.32) (1.35)
Market Inflation Rate Expectations (t-1) 0.24 0.48** 0.27 0.50**
(0.18) (0.19) (0.18) (0.19)
Market Inflation Rate Expectations (t-2) -0.39** -0.40**
(0.15) (0.15)
Interest Rate (t-1)  0.27*** 0.29*** 0.25*** 0.27***
(0.07) (0.07) (0.08) (0.08)
Inflation Rate Target (12-Month Ahead) 0.74*** 0.96*** 0.70*** 0.95***
(0.22) (0.24) (0.23) (0.24)
12-Month Inflation Rate (t-1)  0.06 0.08
(0.10) (0.11)
R-squared 0.8978 0.9030 0.8993 0.9053
Adjusted R-squared 0.8855 0.8861 0.8826 0.8838
LM Test for Autocorrelation of Residuals (p-values)
1 lag 0.0663 0.5196 0.0652 0.7730
4 lags 0.0160 0.1333 0.0149 0.1316
Notes: Standard error in parantheses. *, **, and *** indicate the coefficient is significant at 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively.
Regressors
Coefficients and standard errors
Table 4
Estimation of Reaction Function of Inflation Expectations
Dependent Variable: Market Inflation Rate Expectations (Adjusted)  19
significantly to the inflation targets (coefficient equal to 0.96). Since this result could be 
a consequence of some correlation between targets and past inflation, we also include 
the actual 12-month inflation rate in the regression (specifications III and IV). This 
variable is not statistically significant. Therefore, there are indications that the 
expectations are forward looking, and the inflation targets play an important role.   
  In summary, although the actual inflation rate has been above the upper limit of 
the tolerance interval in 2001 and 2002, the inflation targeting regime has been 
successful in anchoring expectations. This is a consequence of the gains of credibility 
that the Central Bank has achieved since the implementation of the inflation targeting 
regime. 
 
3.1.3. Change in the inflation dynamics 
  As the inflation targeting regime is supposed to affect the formation of inflation 
expectations, we can consider the possibility that the backward-looking component in 
price adjustment has become less important. The share of backward-looking firms could 
have become smaller and/or firms could give less consideration to past inflation when 
adjusting prices. This would reduce the degree of persistence in inflation. Following 
Kuttner and Posen (1999), we estimate a simple aggregate supply curve for the low 
inflation period to assess whether the inflation targeting regime was accompanied by 
some structural change.
16 Using monthly data, we regress the inflation rate (measured 
by IPCA) on its own lags, the unemployment rate
17 (lagged one period), and the 
exchange rate change in 12 months (lagged one period). The regression also includes 
dummy variables that multiply the regressors referred to for the inflation targeting 
period. The inflation rate and exchange rate change are measured in monthly terms. 
Table 5 shows three different specifications. In the first, we include only one lag 
for inflation and do not include the exchange rate change. From the estimated 
coefficients on the dummy variables, we can conclude that there is a statistically 
significant change in the constant and in the coefficient on lagged inflation in the 
inflation targeting period.  The autoregressive  coefficient  falls  from  0.74 to 0.15.  The  
                                                 
16 It is important to stress that the Central Bank structural model used for inflation forecasting employs 
quarterly data, and has a different specification, for example, it includes a forward-looking term for 
inflation, and a term for the output gap instead of the unemployment rate. 
17 We use the seasonally adjusted unemployment rate (criterion seven days) produced by IBGE. The 
results are qualitatively similar if we use the raw data or the unemployment rate estimated according to 
the criterion of thirty days.   20
    
coefficient on lagged unemployment is negative. In all three specifications, there is no 
statistically significant change in the coefficient on lagged unemployment.
18 However, 
                                                 
18 The estimations reported in Table 5 were conducted without including the terms corresponding to the 







Constant 0.74** 0.81** 0.79**
(0.36) (0.35) (0.32)
Dummy*Constant 0.38*** 0.56*** 0.39***
(0.14) (0.15) (0.14)
Inflation Rate (t-1) 0.74*** 0.81*** 0.61***
(0.09) (0.12) (0.13)
Dummy*Inflation Rate(t-1) -0.59*** -0.58*** -0.41**
(0.20) (0.21) (0.19)
Inflation Rate (t-2) -0.12 -0.09
(0.12) (0.12)
Dummy*Inflation Rate (t-2) -0.30 -0.24
(0.20) (0.19)
Unemployment (t-1) -0.09* -0.10** -0.10**
(0.05) (0.05) (0.05)
Exchange Rate Change (t-1) 0.10***
(Twelve-Month Average) (0.04)
Dummy for 2000:07 1.08***
(0.33)
R-squared 0.6431 0.6766 0.5537
Adjusted R-squared 0.6269 0.6538 0.5055
LM Test for Autocorrelation of Residuals (p-values)
1 lag 0.1857 0.8353 0.5454
4 lags 0.0040 0.1693 0.1081
Notes: Standard error in parantheses. *, **, and *** indicate the coefficient is significant at 10%, 5%, and 1% level,
respectively. We exclude data for inflation rate previously to 1994:09. The sample size starts in 1994:10, 1994:11 and
1995:08 (for the exchange rate we excluded data previous to 1994:06), respectively, and ends in 2002:06. Dummy refers to
the inflation-targeting period, unless otherwise noticed.
Coefficients and standard errors
Regressors
Table 5
Estimation of Aggregate Supply Curve
Dependent Variable: Monthly Inflation Rate  21
since the residuals present serial autocorrelation, we use a second specification that adds 
another lag for inflation rate. The change in the coefficient of the first lag of the 
inflation rate is still significant: from 0.81 to 0.23. The sum of the two lags before and 
after the adoption of inflation targeting is 0.69 and -0.19, respectively. Therefore, we 
can conclude that there has been a substantial reduction in the degree of inflation 
persistence after inflation targeting was adopted. This implies a lower output cost to 
curb inflationary pressures and to reduce average inflation.
19  
The third specification includes the lagged exchange rate change.
20 The 
coefficient is positive, and we could not reject the null hypothesis of no structural break 
for the coefficient in the inflation targeting period. For the inflation lagged terms the 
results are relatively similar to those from the second specification (the first 
autoregressive component decreases from 0.61 to 0.20, and the sum of the two lags goes 
from 0.52 to -0.13). The coefficient on the lagged exchange rate is 0.10, which, 
considering the lagged inflation terms, generate a 12-month pass-through of 21% and 
9% for the whole sample and for the inflation targeting period, respectively. The smaller 
pass-through in the recent period, however, is a consequence of the lower degree of 
persistence in inflation. In Section 3.3, we present some estimations of the pass-through 
using a VAR model and the structural model. 
The coefficient on lagged unemployment is about -0.10. Therefore, a one-
percentage point increase in the unemployment rate decreases the inflation rate by 1.2 
percentage points when measured in annual terms. Considering the indirect effects via 
inflation inertia, the total effect over a year in the inflation reduction is 2.3 percentage 
points and 1.1 percentage points for the whole sample and for the inflation targeting 
period, respectively. As before, this result is explained by the different degrees of 
inflation persistence. 
 
                                                 
19 Note that, although the constant in the regression is higher in the inflation targeting period, the 
unconditional expected inflation (up to a constant referring to the natural unemployment rate) is equal to 
2.9 and 1.3 for the periods before and after the adoption of inflation targeting using the first specification; 
and 2.6 and 1.1 employing the second specification.   
20 We use the 12-month change; the one, three and six-month changes were not significant. To avoid the 
presence of autocorrelation in the residuals, we include in the third specification a dummy variable for 
2000:07. After a 0.27% monthly average inflation in the first half of 2000, inflation reached 1.6% in July, 
markedly above market expectations, because of the off-cropping season and a significant rise in 
administered prices. Including this dummy in the three specifications has no major effect on the estimated 
coefficients.    22
3.2. Change in relative prices 
 
Monetary policy has been facing a significant change in relative prices in the 
economy that has markedly affected the inflation rate. Since mid-1995, administered 
prices have increased systematically above market prices.
21 Figure 9 shows the ratio of 
administered prices to market ones since January 1992. The ratio rose 23.7% in the first 
three years of inflation targeting (comparing June 2002 to June 1999). The weight of 
this group in the IPCA grew from a 17% average (from January 1991 to July 1999) to 
28% in August 1999 as a result of a new household budget survey. It reached 30.8% in 
June 2002 because its changes were greater than those of market prices. 
 
 
  The dynamics of administered prices differ from those of market prices in three 
aspects: 
  a) dependence on international prices in the case of oil by-products; 
  b) a greater pass-through from exchange rate. There are three basic links: i) the 
price of oil by-products depends on oil prices denominated in domestic currency; ii) 
electricity rates are partly linked to exchange rate variations; and iii) the price 
adjustments settled in the contracts that govern electricity and telephone rates are partly 
                                                 
21 For more details on the behavior of administered prices, see Figueiredo (2002). 
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indexed to the General Price Index (IGP), which is more affected by the exchange rate 
than the consumer price indexes; 
  c) stronger backward-looking behavior. Electricity and telephone rates are 
generally adjusted annually, and the contractual clauses usually estipulate that 
adjustments should be based on a weighted average of the past change of IGP and of the 
exchange rate. 
The issues in the items "a" and "c" are beyond the control of monetary policy, 
and the exchange rate (item "b") is only partially affected by monetary policy. In 
particular, these three factors have exerted strong inflationary pressures during the 
inflation targeting period. Between June 1999 and June 2002, the oil price rose 53.0% 
(from US$ 15.77 to US$ 24.13 a barrel of crude oil - Europe Brent). The exchange rate 
increased by 53.7% in the same period, and by 125.2% if we compare to December 
1998 (a depreciation of the domestic currency of 35.0% and 55.6%, respectively). The 
presence of a strong backward-looking component implies a higher output cost and 
inflation rate during periods of disinflation. First, the response of inflation to any 
inflationary shock is more persistent. Second, since the inflation targets for Brazil are 
decreasing, it is important that the price adjustments converge to the targets to reduce or 
avoid output costs. In the presence of stronger backward-looking behavior, however, the 
adjustment is slower, implying a greater output gap reduction to meet the targets. 
  Moreover, the telephone, electricity and oil by-products sectors faced some 
major structural reforms that had some initial implications for the inflation rate. Fixed 
telephone rates saw two spikes in 1996 and 1997 because the line acquisition fee 
experienced a sharp fall (not included in the price index), whereas phone rates 
increased. The oil by-products sector underwent deregulation at the beginning of 2002 
with the end of control on prices and of subsidies to cooking gas (whose prices rose 
about 18% in January 2002). In the case of electricity, the rationing between 2001 and 
2002 led to a rise in the electricity rates. 
  Figure 10 shows the path of the price levels of gasoline, cooking gas, telephone 
use, electricity, urban bus, and the headline IPCA level from December 1998 through 
June 2002. It is clear that these prices have exerted significant pressure on the inflation 
rate.   24
 
The effect of the inflation rate on relative prices is broadly known. In this paper, 
we stress the effect of change in relative prices on the inflation rate. As a measure of the 
dispersion of relative prices we use the standard deviation of the monthly change of the 
52 items that comprise the IPCA. We then test for Granger causality between relative 
prices and inflation rate.
22 The results are reported in Table 6, which shows the 
estimation using one and three lags (selected with Schwarz and Akaike information 
criteria, respectively) for a sample from 1994:12 to 2002:06. We can reject the null 
hypothesis that relative prices do not Granger cause the inflation rate. Therefore, change 
in relative prices conveys information about future inflation. We can also reject the null 
hypothesis that inflation rate does not Granger cause relative prices. 
 
                                                 
22 We can reject that they are integrated of order one. 
Figure 10















































































































































IPCA Cooking Gas Electricity Gasoline Fixed Telephone Urban Bus
F-statistic P-value F-statistic P-value
Relative Prices do not Granger Cause Inflation Rate 2.89 0.0926 3.15 0.0293
Inflation Rate does not Granger Cause Relative Prices 16.71 0.0001 5.35 0.0020
Null Hypothesis
Table 6
Granger Causality Test: Relative Prices and Inflation Rate (IPCA)
Sample: 1994:12 - 2002:06
1 lag 3 lags  25
3.3. Exchange rate volatility 
 
Dealing with exchange rate volatility has been one of the main challenges faced 
by inflation targeting regimes in emerging market economies. Compared to 
industrialized economies, emerging markets seem to be more sensitive to the effects of 
financial crisis in other countries. Exchange rate market volatility generates frequent 
revisions of inflation rate expectations and may result in non-fulfillment of inflation 
targets. As a general rule, the actions of the central bank should not move the exchange 
rate to artificial or unsustainable levels. However, the central bank may react to 
exchange rate movements to curb the resulting inflationary pressures and to reduce the 
financial impact on dollar denominated assets and liabilities in the balance sheet of 
firms. 
Regarding the financial problems associated with exchange rate volatility, 
Haussmann, Panizza and Stein (2001) argue that all countries that are not able to issue 
debt in their own currency are more vulnerable to the impact of currency mismatches in 
their balance sheets. Those mismatches are even more dramatic in a financially 
integrated world, where rumors of financial problems may lead to capital flight that 
might produce self-fulfilling crises, generating bad equilibrium. As observed by 
Schmidt-Hebel and Werner (2002) the level of reserve works as an insurance against the 
occurrence of this bad equilibrium. If the entire burden of the adjustment to capital 
outflows during a financial crisis is borne by exchange rate depreciation, the country 
might have a backward bending exchange rate supply curve with no equilibrium being 
possible. The authors justify foreign exchange rate intervention based on the following 
reasons: (i) facilitating adjustment to sudden reductions in capital inflows; (ii) 
accumulating reserves; (iii) reducing excessive exchange rate volatility (associated with 
lower liquidity in foreign exchange markets); and (iv) raising the supply of exchange 
rate insurance. 
  Given the problems associated with exchange rate volatility and the pros of 
intervention, the Central Bank of Brazil, like other emerging markets economies, 
including some that also adopt inflation targeting, has actually been implementing a 
dirty-floating exchange rate policy.
23 Such interventions are made as transparent as 
possible in order to avoid the concern expressed by Mishkin (2000) that intervention 
                                                 
23 Calvo and Reinhart (2000) discuss the limited empirical evidence of truly free-floating countries.    26
may hinder the credibility of monetary policy as the public may realize that stabilizing 
the exchange rate takes precedence over promoting price stability as a policy objective. 
In Brazil, the volatility of the exchange rate has been considerable. From 
1999:07 through 2002:06, the exchange rate (monthly average) increased on average 
1.2% per month, with a standard error of 3.6 and a coefficient of variation (ratio of 
standard error to average) of 3.0. The inflationary pressures resulting from exchange 
rate depreciation are more related to the magnitude of the depreciation than to the pass-
through coefficient
24. According to the structural model of the Central Bank, the pass-
through to market prices inflation, as a percentage of the observed depreciation, is 12% 
after one year of the depreciation. The pass-through to administered prices is estimated 
to be 25%, resulting in a pass-through of about 16% for the headline IPCA. In line with 
the estimates, between January 2001 and August 2002, the price of the dollar moved 
from R$ 1.95 to R$ 3.11, implying an increase of 59.5%. In the same period, the IPCA 
rose 12.2%. In this sense, Brazil seems to be closer to the lower end of the estimates 
done by Haussmann, Panizza and Stein (2001). They estimated the pass-through 
accumulated in 12 months for more than 40 countries and found a value below 5% for 
G-7 countries, and, at the other extreme, figures above 50% for countries like Mexico, 
Paraguay and Poland.  
  We can also use a VAR estimation with monthly data to assess the pass-through 
and the importance of exchange rate shocks to inflation rate variability. We use two 
specifications. Both include output, spread of EMBI+ (Emerging Markets Bond Index 
Plus) over Treasury bonds,
25 exchange rate (monthly average), and interest rate 
(monthly average). Output is measured by industrial production, seasonally adjusted 
data, produced by IBGE. The inclusion of EMBI+ was necessary because it is a good 
indicator for financial crises, both foreign (Mexico, Asia, Russia, Argentina) and 
domestic (beginning of 1999), which have a significant impact on interest rates. The 
interest rate is the Selic overnight rate, the basic interest rate in the economy, controlled 
by the Central Bank. In the first specification, we use administered and market prices as 
variables, whereas in the second we use the consumer price index IPCA instead. We 
estimate the model in levels, that is, using I(1) and I(0) regressors instead of using the 
                                                 
24 See Goldfajn and Werlang (2000) for the reasons for the low pass-through in the Brazilian January 
1999 devaluation episode. 
25 We use EMBI from Sept./1994 through Dec./1998, and EMBI+ thereafter.   27
error correction representation.
26 The estimation is consistent and captures possible 
existing cointegration relationships (Sims, Stock, and Watson, 1990; Watson, 1994). 
The variables used are the log-levels of output, administered prices, market prices, 
IPCA and exchange rate, and the levels of EMBI+ spread and interest rate. We use a 
Cholesky decomposition with the following order in the first specification: output, 
administered prices, market prices, EMBI+, exchange rate, and interest rate. In the 
second specification, the consumer price index substitutes for administered and market 
prices. Since the financial variables react more rapidly to shocks, we include them after 
output and price. We also estimate using interest rate before exchange rate. The results, 
even numerically, are very similar. We use two samples. The first one includes the 
whole period of the Real Plan, from September 1994 through June 2002.
27 The second 
sample starts with the implementation of the inflation targeting regime (July 1999) in 
order to try to capture some specificities of the recent period. However, since the sample 
is very short, the estimation does not generate statistically significant results.  
  Figure 11 shows the impulse responses to a one standard deviation of exchange 
rate shock, using the whole sample. It presents the point estimates and the two-standard-
error bands, which were estimated using a Monte Carlo experiment with 1000 draws. 
The values shown are percentage points. The lag length of the VAR estimations was 
chosen according to the Schwarz criterion, but we test for the presence of serial 
correlation of residuals, and increase the number of lags when necessary to obtain no 
serial correlated residuals.
28 The responses of administered and market prices are 
positive and statistically significant. The increase in administered prices is greater than 
that of market prices (note that the scales in the graphs are different). The exchange rate 
increases initially 2.6%, reaching a total of 4.3% in the second month, and starts 
decreasing after that. The rise of both administered prices and market prices reaches a 
maximum in the eighth month. The values of the pass-through are presented in Table 7. 
We estimate the pass-through as the ratio of the price increase in a 12-month horizon to 
the value of the exchange rate shock. If we consider the value of the exchange rate 
shock in the first month, the pass-through is 19.7% for the administered prices, and 
                                                 
26 According to augmented Dickey-Fuller unit root tests, we can accept the presence of a unit root for the 
log-levels of IPCA, administered prices, market prices, exchange rate, interest rate, and for the level of 
EMBI+ spread. We reject the presence of a unit root for the monthly change of those variables, and for 
the level of interest rate. 
27 July and August 1994 were excluded because the price indexes were still "contaminated" by the 
previous high inflation period. In this case, the start of the sample is adjusted according to the number of 
lags used. 
28 We have used four lags for both specifications.   28
7.8% for the market prices. Considering the value of the exchange rate shock in the 
second month, the pass-through is 12.1% and 4.8%, respectively. The pass-through for 
the administered prices is 2.5 higher than that for market prices. Figure 12 shows the 
responses in the case of the specification that includes the IPCA instead of administered 
and market prices.
29 The pass-through to the IPCA was estimated at 14.1% and 8.4%, 
considering the first and second month shock, respectively. 
  
Figure 11. Impulse Responses of Administered Prices (ADMP), Market Prices (FREEP) 









Figure 12. Impulse Responses of Price Level (IPCA) and Exchange Rate to an 









We also consider a variance decomposition analysis, which gives the percentage 
of the forecast error variance of a variable that can be attributed to a shock to a specific 
variable. The influence of exchange rate shocks on administered prices is greater than 
on market prices. Considering a 12-month horizon, shocks to the exchange rate explain 
24.9% of the forecast error variance of administered prices, and 16.3% of that of market 
prices. Using the specification with the IPCA, the value is 23.0%. 
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  Since the inflation targeting regime may have represented a structural change in 
the relationships, and the exchange rate regime is different from most of the previous 
period, we estimate a VAR model for the first three years of inflation targeting 
(1999:07-2002:06). However, the sample size is too short, and the response of 
administered and market prices is positive, but not statistically significant using a two-
standard-error band (they are significant in the first months if we use a one-standard-
error band).  To compare with the previous estimation, however, we show the point 
estimates in Table 7. They are very similar to those found for the whole sample.
30 These 
results using a VAR model are not in line with those in Muinhos (2001), which shows a 
structural break in the pass-through coefficient when the exchange rate regime changed.  
The estimations are conducted using a linear and a non-linear Phillips curve. The pass-
through in the same quarter of the exchange rate change fell from more than 50% to less 
than 10%. 
In terms of variance decomposition, exchange rate shocks explain 23.4% and 
40.2% of the forecast error variance of administered and market prices, respectively, in 
a 12-month horizon (the first value is almost statistically significant, and the second is 
significant). Therefore, in this estimation, the contribution of exchange rate shocks was 
                                                 
30 We have used two lags in both specifications. With the IPCA and three lags, however, the values are 











Pass-Through Using the 
First Month Exchange 
Rate Shock
19.7 7.8 14.1 18.8 8.4 12.6
Pass-Through Using the 
Second Month Exchange 
Rate Shock
12.1 4.8 8.4 11.6 5.2 7.8
Ratio of Pass-Through 
Administered Prices to 
Market Prices
2.5 2.2
Real Plan Period Inflation-Targeting Period
Value of Exchange Rate 
Shock Considered
Table 7
Pass-Through Considering Different Specifications:
Sample
Ratio of Price Change (12-month horizon) to an Exchange Rate Shock  30
greater for market prices than for the administered. For the case of the IPCA, the 
exchange rate shocks explain 32.8% of the forecast error variance of prices. 
Therefore, exchange rate volatility is an important source of inflation variability. 
The design of the inflation targeting framework has to take into account this issue to 
avoid that a possible non-fulfillment of inflation targets as a result of exchange rate 
volatility decreasing the credibility of the central bank. 
 
 
4. Methodology for calculating inflation inertia and the effects of the shock to 
administered prices 
 
The interest rate should react to inflationary shocks. However, monetary 
policymakers have to consider several issues concerning the shocks: their nature 
(demand or supply shocks), degree of persistence (temporary or permanent), size and 
their inflationary impact. In the case of supply shocks, there is a trade-off between 
output gap and inflation.
31 The optimal response of the interest rate depends on the 
degree of inflation aversion, on the response of inflation to the output gap, and on the 
degree of persistence of the shock. Monetary policy should react less, and we can even 
consider that it may not react, when supply shocks are temporary or have a small size. 
Likewise, the greater the time horizon of the inflation target, the lower the reaction of 
the central bank. 
As discussed in previous sections, change in relative prices has been one of the 
main challenges faced by the Central Bank of Brazil. Since the implementation of the 
Real Plan, in July 1994, administered price inflation has been well above market price 
inflation. As long as there is some downward rigidity in prices, change in relative prices 
is usually translated into higher inflation. However, monetary policy should be oriented 
towards eliminating only the secondary effect of supply shocks on the inflation rate 
while preserving the initial realignment of relative prices. Therefore, the efforts of the 
Central Bank to quantify the first-order inflationary impact of administered price 
inflation have become particularly important, since it helps to implement monetary 
policy in a flexible manner and without losing sight of the larger objective of achieving 
the inflation targets set by the National Monetary Council.  
                                                 
31 See Clarida, Galí, and Gertler (1999).   31
The first-order inflationary impact of the shock to administered items is defined 
as the variation in administered prices exceeding the target for the inflation rate, 
weighted by the share of administered prices in the IPCA and excluding the effects of 
the inflation inertia from the previous year and of variations in the exchange rate. The 
effect of the inflation inertia is excluded because inflation propagation mechanisms 
should be neutralized by monetary policy, which has to consider the appropriate period. 
As a rule of thumb, the Central Bank considers 18 months an adequate period to offset 
the inertial effects of higher inflation. The exchange rate variation is excluded because 
this variable is affected by monetary policy and could reflect demand shocks. Therefore, 
in defining the shock to administered prices, only the component of relative price 
change that has no relation to activities of the Central Bank of Brazil is preserved as a 
first-order supply shock.  
This section summarizes the methodology currently used to separate the effect, 
via inertia, of previous-year inflation on current-year inflation, and the inflationary 
impact brought about by the shock to administered prices.
32 In this summary, it is 
assumed that the inertial effects and the pass-through from exchange rate to prices are 
the same for all goods in the economy.  
 
4.1. Calculating the primary effect of the shock to administered prices 
 
The first-order inflationary impact or primary effect of readjustments in 
administered prices is calculated by the difference between administered price inflation 
and the inflation target for the year (weighted by the influence of administered prices on 
the IPCA), excluding the effects of inflation inertia and of the exchange rate variation 
on administered prices: 
 
( ) ), ( *
* CaA IA ShA adm adm + − − = ω π π       (3) 
 
where  ShA = first-order inflationary impact of administered  prices; 
πadm = administered  price inflation; 
π
* = target for the inflation; 
ωadm = weight of administered  prices in the IPCA; 
                                                 
32 See Freitas, Minella, and Riella (2002) for a more detailed description of the methodology.   32
IA = effect of the inertia in the previous year on the evolution of administered 
prices; 
CaA  = effect of the exchange rate variation on the evolution of administered 
prices. 
The following subsection shows the calculation of the IA and CaA components.  
 
4.1.1. Calculating the effect of inflation inertia and exchange rate pass-through on 
administered prices  
The model adopted by the Central Bank of Brazil assumes that the inflation in a 
given quarter depends on the inflation registered in the previous quarter, which in turn 
depends on the inflation in the quarter before, and so on. The inertia inherited in a given 
year results from the inflation registered in the last quarter of the previous year, and its 
calculation is based on the inflation that exceeded the target. The inertia inherited from 
the last quarter of the previous year impacts the inflation in each quarter of the current 
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where
t y j I ,  = effect of the inflation inertia in the previous year (yt-1) on the inflation of 
the j
th quarter of the current year (yt); 
1 , 4 − = t y j π = inflation in the last quarter (j=4) of the previous year (yt-1); 
*
, 4 1 − = t y j π = inflation target in the last quarter of the previous year, approximated 
by one quarter of the target set for that year; 
Cinertia = coefficient that measures the pass-through of the inflation in the 
previous quarter to the current quarter, according to Central Bank estimates. This 
coefficient is raised to the j
th power; 
ωgroup = weight of the group (market or administered prices) in the IPCA. 
The total impact of previous-year inflation on current-year inflation via inertia is 
obtained by adding the effects estimated for each quarter: 
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where Π represents the productory symbol. In this paper, we assume, for simplicity, that 
I = IA, that is, the inertia estimated for administered prices is the same as that for market 
prices. 
The formula below shows how to measure the influence of exchange rate 
variation on the primary impact of the shock to administered prices:  
 
ω α * * ) ( 2 k t t t e e CaC − − = ,         ( 6 )  
 
where  CaCt  = effect of the exchange rate variation on the price adjustment of utility C 
in month t; 
(et-1 – et-k)  =   exchange rate variation accumulated from t-k to t. The value of k 
depends on the specific good one is analyzing. There are utilities whose price 
adjustments depend on the 12-month exchange rate variation, while for other goods, 
such as gasoline, price adjustment is based on the evolution of the exchange rate in the 
previous month. As stated before, for simplicity, we assume all goods follow the same 
rule; 
2 α =  pass-through of the exchange rate variation to prices; 
ω  = weight of the specific good in the IPCA. In this paper, it corresponds to 
administered prices as a whole. 
 
4.2. An example 
 
  Table 8 shows a hypothetical example of how the primary effect of the shock to 
administered prices and the inertia inherited from the previous year could be useful in a 
monetary policy decision. This example was built assuming that the target for inflation 
is 4% and expected inflation is 5%. 
According to this example, inflation is expected to be 1 percentage point above 
the target for that year. Cookbook recipe would suggest that Copom raise interest rate
33. 
However,  Copom should adjust the target, adding the impact of inertia to be tolerated 
in that year (line c) and the primary effect of the shock to administered prices (line h). 
                                                 
33 Even if the projected deviation from the target were caused only by demand shocks, the optimal 
response of the Central Bank would not necessarily be to raise interest rates. It would depend on the 
effectiveness of monetary policy in reducing inflation in that year, the inflation forecasts for the following 
years, the expected duration of the shock, etc.   34
Observe that Copom interprets as a shock not the whole increase in administered prices, 
but only the increase that is not explained by inertia and the exchange rate change. 
The target adjusted by the above-mentioned effects rises to 4.9%, which is close 
to the inflation forecast of 5%. Hence, in this case, the optimal policy would be to leave 
interest rates unchanged. There are, however, other points to be taken into 
consideration. The most important one is the trade-off between credibility and flexibility 
that arises when the forecast for inflation approaches the upper limit of the tolerance 
interval, while the forecast excluding the inertia and administered price shocks remains 
around the target. There is no clear answer for solving this trade-off, but, as a general 
guideline, the Central Bank should be more flexible the higher its credibility, the better 
it can communicate with the market, and the stronger the output loss involved if 
inflation is brought back to target. In this sense, the bands should be considered mainly 
as checkpoints, with the Central Bank explaining clearly the reasons for the non-
fulfillment of the targets. 
 
Item %
(a) Target for year t 4.0
(b) Contribution of year t-1 inertia to inflation in year t 0.8
(c) Inertia from year t-1 to be accomodated in year t (= b/2) 0.4
(d) Administered price inflation forecast for year t 8.0
(e) Contribution of admintered price inflation above the target ( = ((d) - p
target)wadm) 1.2
(f) Inertia effects of year t-1 on year t administered price inflation 0.2
(g) Exchange rate impact on administered price inflation 0.5
(h) Primary effect of the shock to administered prices (= e - f - g) 0.5
(i) Target adjusted for inertia effect from previous year and for the primary effect of the shocks to 
administered prices (= a + c + h)
(j) Inflation forecast for year t 5.0
Example of Calculation of the Target Adjusted for Inertia Effect from Previous Year and for the Primary Effect of the 
Shock to Admnistered Prices
4.9
Table 8
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5. Institutional design of inflation targeting 
 
  The inflation targeting framework has to be designed in such way that the 
conduct of monetary policy is oriented consistently towards the fulfillment of the 
targets, but at the same time takes into account the limits for achieving this. The 
inflation is not totally under the control of the monetary authority, and output costs have 
to be considered. There are various sources for the non-fulfillment of targets. The first 
relates to the models used by central banks: model misspecification, uncertainty 
concerning the estimated coefficients, possible structural breaks, existence of variables 
that are difficult to model, etc. The second is the presence of unexpected shocks in the 
economy. The third is the presence of lags in the effects of monetary policy. 
  We stress four issues involved in the institutional design of inflation targeting: i) 
the choice of price index (core versus headline inflation), ii) the inclusion or not of 
escape clauses, iii) the size of the tolerance intervals (bands), and iv) the horizon and 
criteria used for the targets.
34 Besides these issues, it is important to note the current gap 
in the Brazilian institutional framework represented by the absence of central bank 
independence. Central bank independence has been implemented in several countries, 
and is an important element for consolidating a policy oriented towards price stability. 
 
5.1. “To core or not to core” 
 
  The use of some measure of core inflation has been justified on the grounds that 
a measure of inflation that is less sensitive to temporary price movements and more 
reflective of the long-term trend is necessary. Monetary policy should not target a 
variable that is subject to temporary movements. A core inflation measure is also 
justified based on the argument that a measure of inflation that is less sensitive to supply 
shocks, such as oil prices shocks, is necessary. 
There are different measures of core inflation. The most common methodologies 
are the exclusion method, and the trimmed mean method. The first usually excludes 
some items such as food, oil by-products, and other energy prices because these prices 
present high seasonality and are often subject to supply shocks. The symmetric trimmed 
mean core excludes the items presenting the higher and the lowest change in the period. 
                                                 
34 For different international experiences in terms of these four items, see Ferreira and Petrassi (2002), 
and Mishkin and Schmidt-Hebbel (2002).    36
The items are ordered according to their change. The items excluded are those whose 
accumulated weight from the top of the list reaches some threshold, say 20% or 30%, 
and those following the same criterion from the bottom of the list.
35 
In Brazil, the change in relative prices has motivated the discussion of the 
adoption of a core inflation measure, in particular, a measure that would exclude 
administered prices. Nowadays, only a few countries target a core inflation measure, for 
example Canada and Thailand, which use core by exclusion. We do not include in this 
group countries such as the United Kingdom and South Africa, which use an inflation 
measure that excludes only mortgage interest rates. In this case, the motivation for the 
adoption of an exclusion index is different: increases in interest rates, via mortgage 
rates, positively affect the headline inflation rate. Actually, the international experience 
has pointed to the use of headline indices: Australia, New Zealand, and the Czech 
Republic abandoned the use of core inflation measures in 1998, 1999, and 2002, 
respectively. Other countries, such as Colombia, Iceland, Israel, Mexico, Peru, Poland, 
Sweden, and Switzerland also use headline inflation (Ferreira and Petrassi, 2002).  
The main argument against the use of core inflation is that it is less 
representative of the loss of the purchasing power of money. Agents are concerned 
about the whole basket of consumption. In the Brazilian case, exclusion of the 
administered items would imply leaving out more than 30% of the representative 
consumption basket. In this sense, private agents may question a monetary policy that is 
not concerned about the overall consumer price index.  
Furthermore, in the Brazilian case, on some occasions during the 1970s and 
1980s, the government excluded some items from the headline index on an ad hoc basis 
in order to reduce the official inflation rate, or even changed the official index. As a 
result, the agents in Brazil tend to be reluctant to accept an index that excludes some 
items because it reminds them of these changes in the past.  
  The adoption of a trimmed mean core in turn would imply a great loss in terms 
of communicability. The basket that comprises the index is not known a priori: it 
depends on the evolution of prices. Furthermore, the choice of the threshold is not 
                                                 
35 The sample of the variations of the inflation rate components is ordered {x1, ... , xn} with their 
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components to be considered in the computation of the trimmed mean with α%,  and W i is the 
accumulated weight up to i-th component (Figueiredo, 2001).   37
trivial, and is necessary to smooth some prices whose adjustments take place only from 
time to time.
36 The Central Bank of Brazil uses a 20% symmetric trimmed mean core 
that includes the smoothing of eight items.
37 Figure 13 presents the monthly headline 
(IPCA) and core inflation rates. The core measure is considerably less volatile than the 
headline. The standard deviation of core inflation is 0.28 and that of headline inflation 
0.42 (sample 1996:01-2002:08). 
Nevertheless, the trimmed mean core has been shown to play an important role 
as predictor of inflation trend. Table 9 shows Granger causality tests between core 
inflation and headline inflation (IPCA).
38 We find that core inflation Granger causes 
headline inflation, that is, core inflation conveys information about future inflation 
(beyond that contained in past inflation), and inflation rate does not Granger cause core 
inflation. Therefore, core inflation can be used as a useful source of information about 
future inflation. 
 
                                                 
36 The discontinuous adjustments tend to be larger than the average. Therefore, in the absence of 
smoothing, these items would be systematically excluded. 
37 See Figueiredo (2001) for an evaluation of different core measures for Brazil. 
38 See also Figueiredo and Staub (2002). Figueiredo (2001) found that the core measure has the "attractor" 
property as well. 
Figure 13 
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5.2. Escape clauses 
 
Since the inflation rate is subject to several factors that are beyond the control of 
monetary policy, the success of the conduct of monetary policy should not be judged 
exclusively in terms of the fulfillment or not of the inflation targets. Under some 
circumstances, such as significant supply shocks, the central bank cannot avoid the 
inflationary impact of the shock because of the presence of lags in the effects of 
monetary policy or should not avoid it because of the associated output costs.  
  In the case of escape clauses included in the inflation targeting framework, the 
circumstances under which the central bank can justify the non-fulfillment of the targets 
are set in advance. The inflation target design in New Zealand, South Africa, the Czech 
Republic and Switzerland includes escape clauses (Ferreira and Petrassi, 2002). In New 
Zealand, they can be invoked in the case of unpredictable events that can affect the 
inflation rate, such as natural disasters, and change in commodity prices and indirect tax 
rates. In South Africa, escape clauses include significant change in terms of trade, 
natural disasters, and interruption of external capital flows. Besides significant changes 
in international prices and agricultural production, natural disasters, and change in 
indirect tax rates, escape clauses in the Czech Republic comprise changes in regulated 
prices that affect headline inflation by more than 1-1.5 percentage points, and large 
changes in the exchange rate not related to domestic monetary policy. In Switzerland, 
escape clauses refer to change in the exchange rate and the prices of some items such as 
oil and imported goods. 
  There is clearly a trade-off in the adoption of escape clauses in the framework. 
Their inclusion allows a better assessment of the conduct of the central bank, and may 
F-statistic P-value F-statistic P-value
Core Inflation does not Granger Cause Inflation Rate 4.83 0.0311 7.14 0.0015
Inflation Rate does not Granger Cause Core Inflation 0.04 0.8479 0.98 0.3797
Null Hypothesis
Table 9
Granger Causality Test: Core Inflation and Inflation Rate (IPCA)
Sample: 1996:01 - 2002:06
1 lag 2 lags  39
avoid excessive responses from monetary policy that could otherwise occur. However, 
their adoption may signal that the monetary authority will be lenient towards some 
inflationary pressures, and their excessive use can affect the credibility of the regime. 
  In the Brazilian case, since the regime is still relatively new, and its credibility is 
still under construction, the adoption of escape clauses could negatively affect its 
credibility. Furthermore, the tolerance intervals should be enough to accommodate most 
of the shocks that the economy is subject to. 
 
5.3. Tolerance intervals (bands) 
 
  The limits of the forecasting models, the possibility of unexpected shocks hitting 
the economy, and the presence of lags in the effects of monetary policy justify either the 
use of tolerance intervals for the point targets or the use of range targets in the absence 
of point targets in most of the inflation targeting countries. The size of the bands varies 
across countries: going from 1 percentage point in Australia and Israel to 3 percentage 
points in South Africa, 3.5 in Iceland, and 4 in Brazil for 2002 and 5 for 2003 and 2004. 
  The size of the bands should be large enough to allow the inflation rate to be 
within them in most circumstances, but at the same time they are not supposed to be too 
large to avoid a lenient conduct of monetary policy. The size of the bands has to be 
established according to the importance of the three factors mentioned above: it depends 
on the limits of the forecasting models, the frequency and magnitude of the shocks that 
the economy is subject to, and the lag length of the effects of monetary policy. In the 
Brazilian economy, it is clear that the first two factors lead to a larger band size. First, 
other economies can use models estimated using a large sample because they have a 
much longer history of stability, and in many cases the inflation targeting regime has 
been adopted over a longer period.
39 As a result, the forecast model can be estimated 
more precisely. In Brazil, the dynamics of inflation in the high-inflation period are 
markedly different from those in the low-inflation period. As a consequence, most of 
the estimations that model inflation have to start after June 1994. Moreover, with just 
three years of inflation targeting, possible structural breaks in the relationships are not 
easily found. Second, the Brazilian economy has been hit by frequent and large shocks. 
Most of them are related to its position as an emerging market economy – high volatility 
                                                 
39 Since there is a transition period of learning, possible structural changes with the new regime can be 
found more easily with a larger sample.    40
of country risk premium and of the exchange rate – and to some structural 
transformations that led to a change in relative prices. The volatility of the inflation rate 
and exchange rate in Brazil is still one of the highest in inflation targeting economies.  
As we saw in previous sections, the exchange rate depreciation accounted for 
38% and 48% of the inflation rate in 2001 and January-August 2002, respectively. 
Furthermore, exchange rate shocks explain 24.9% and 32.8% of the 12-month ahead 
forecast error variance of the inflation rate considering samples for the whole Real Plan 
period and for the inflation targeting period, respectively. The upper limit of the 
tolerance interval in 2001 was not enough to accommodate the shocks. Taking into 
account these factors affecting the band size, the National Monetary Council (CMN) has 
enlarged the tolerance intervals from 2 percentage points to 2.5 percentage points above 
and below the central targets for 2003 and 2004. 
 
5.4. Establishment of targets and target horizon 
 
  The inflation targets have to be set taking into account both the long-term goal 
of price stability and the conditions for their achievement. If the actual or expected 
inflation rate is above the long-term goal, the targets have to be set in such way that the 
inflation rate converges to it. However, it is necessary to take into consideration the 
associated output costs, and some country specificities that may lead to a medium-term 
inflation rate goal above a long-term one.  
The length of the target horizon has also implications for the magnitude of the 
response of monetary policy to shocks. The longer the target horizon, the smaller the 
effects of current shocks in expected inflation for the target horizon. As a consequence, 
monetary policy tends to respond less to shocks.   
The targets in Brazil are set in June by the CMN for the end of the calendar year 
two years ahead. The initial targets were established taking into account the domestic 
currency depreciation of the beginning of 1999, and aiming at reducing the inflation rate 
to low levels. In June 1999, the targets were established at 8%, 6%, and 4% for 1999, 
2000 and 2001, respectively, and, in June 2000, at 3.5% for 2002. In principle, inflation 
targets should not be changed to avoid loss of credibility. Nevertheless, the continuous 
pursuit of targets that are perceived in advance as having low probability of being 
achievable would reduce the credibility of the Central Bank. Taking into account this 
balance of risks, the CMN decided in June 2002 to revise upwards the target for 2003   41
from 3.25% to 4%, and set the target at 3.75% for 2004. We consider that private agents 
in general have positively appraised the revision. Insisting on an unrealistic target would 




  The inflation targeting regime in Brazil is relatively new, but has shown to be 
important in achieving low inflation rate levels even in a context of large shocks. The 
presence of a central bank committed to achieving preannounced inflation targets has 
worked as an important coordinator of expectations and generated a more stable 
inflation scenario. The pursuit of the goal, and the significant increase in the 
transparency that has marked the conduct of the monetary policy – including the release 
of the minutes of Copom meetings seven days after the event and of the quarterly 
Inflation Report – have helped develop of the awareness of the importance of the price 
stability commitment. 
  In this period, the regime has faced many challenges, including the construction 
of credibility – still under way – the change in relative prices, and the exchange rate 
volatility. Dealing with them has required a large effort of the Central Bank, which itself 
has also learned substantially and improved the system. The Central Bank has reacted 
strongly to inflation expectations, consistent with the inflation targeting framework. 
Market expectations have behaved in a controlled way, even in the presence of 
inflationary shocks. The estimations also indicate a reduction in the degree of inflation 
persistence and in the volatility of output and inflation.  
The increase in administered prices and the exchange rate depreciation have 
exerted significant inflationary pressures. The Central Bank has developed a 
methodology to estimate the different sources of inflation, which has been used in the 
conduct of monetary policy. 
Several issues comprise the institutional design of the inflation targeting 
framework. The conclusions pointed to the maintenance of headline inflation as the 
target and to the enlargement of the tolerance intervals (adopted for 2003 and 2004). 
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